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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. J. HUBER and 
RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 




Petition for Rehearing 
Appellant Victor Newman respectfully petitions the 
Honorable Supreme Court for a rehearing of his appeal 
from the district court judgment of $19,451.03 and for a 
reversal of said judgment with directions for a new trial, 
upon the ground that this Court in its opinion and judg-
ment herein erred as follows : 
1. In treating Benson v. Rozelle, 85 Utah 582 as over-
ruled and displaced by Gibbs v. District Court, 86 Utah, 314, 
whereas. in both the Gibbs case and this case the Court dis-
tinguished the Rozelle case and left' it in force within the 
scope thereof. 
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2. In treating the Gibbs case procedure as sustain-
ing the judgment appealed from herein, whereas said judg-
ment is reprobated thereby. 
3. In holding the "Findings of Fact" by the Court 
(rec. p. 83'-90) to be complete and responsive to all the 
issues, and adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from, 
whereas said findings do not respond to all the issues nor 
suffice on their face to sustain the judgment complained 
of. 
4. In failing to observe and hold that the paper de-
nominated as the report of the referee, in paragraphs 2, 
5 et seq. of the court's findings of fact, was and is null, 
void and of no effect whatever by reason of recitals on the 
face thereof and on the face of the accompanying record, 
showing that it was not the product or consumation of any 
trial by the referee, judicially conducted according to law 
in the presence of the parties or their attorneys of record, 
or pursuant to any notice to said parties or attorneys of 
the time or place at which a trial would be commenced; 
that no such notice was ever given, and no such trial was 
ever had; and no evidence under oath of any witness was 
ever given in the presence of the parties or their attorneys, 
or otherwise or at all, as required by the provisions of 
Utah Annot. Code 1943, 104-27-6; by Utah Const. art. 1, 
sec. 7, or by U. S. Const. 14th amendment section 1; or 
U. S.· Const. 5th amendment. Thereby appellant was de-
prived of due process of law in the trial and adjudication 
of the facts of this case, and the conclusions of law to be 
drawn therefrom, and in the judgment that resulted there--
from. 
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5. In failing to observe and hold that the so-called 
referee in so proceeding contrary to law was not in fact 
or law a judicial tribunal nor functioning as such, and was 
without jurisdiction or judicial power to act as a referee 
or find or adjudicate the facts upon which the district 
court could render or enter any judgment against appellant, 
nor could the district court amend, add to, or adopt said 
void report or findings. of the referee, in whole or in part. 
6. In failing to observe and hold that, independently 
of said void report of the referee there was not any evidence 
whatever by oral testimony of any witness, or otherwise, or 
at all, to support a finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that appellant owed the appellees $19,451.03, or $13,386.37, 
or any sum or amount whatever. There was no proof of 
debits or credits in favor of or against either appellant or 
appellees, in accounting, nor any evidence upon which a 
balance could be struck or computed in favor of either party 
to this. action against the other; nor any lawful finding or 
adjudication of facts showing any such debits, credits or 
balance upon which any judgment whatever could be law-
fully rendered or entered against this appellant. 
7. In resorting to the rule of decision in equity cases 
upon conflicting evidence supported by Starnley v. Stanley, 
97 Utah, 520, 94 Pac. 2d, 465, for the reason that there 
is absolutely no evidence, conflicting or otherwise, show-
ing any debits., credits or balance due either party hereto 
against the other ; nor any adjudication or finding of facts 
upon which a judgment for $19,451.03 or any other amount 
can be supported. 
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8. In holding, in effect, that any judgment, judicial 
record, or other document that is void upon its face can be 
validated or given effect by the failure or neglect of a 
party to object thereto at any particular time or place; and 
in failing to hold that such void record or document re-
mains void and may be objected to and assailed at any and 
all times and places, upon either direct or collateral attack, 
by any person against whom the same may be offered or 
asserted or sought to be enforced. 
9. In affirming the judgment appealed from as against 
appellant's objections Nos. 1 to 8 hereof. 
10. In affirming said judgment contrary to the pro-
visions of Utah Code, 1943, 69-1-35, and 69-1-37 and other 
sections of said chapter requiring the payment of debts 
before distribution to firm members. 
11. In holding in effect that a trial court may dispense 
with said statutory requirements, if it exact security or in-
demnity from the member who is plaintiff in accounting that 
he will pay his contributive share of the firm debts which 
the defendant member may thereafter be compelled to pay. 
And that the court may, after ordering such security, dis-
pense with the same, and give judgment for a share of the 
gross earnings notwithstanding that plaintiff members 
have failed to give such security or indemnity. 
12. In affirming the judgment below for $19,451.03 
whereas the same is unsupported by evidence or fact finding. 
And for the several reasons shown in ground 1 to 11 hereof. 
13. For the further reasons shown in appellant's 
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separate petition for modification of this court's opinion 
and judgment herein. 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
GROUND 1 
In view of Ground 2 hereof we might dispense with 
Ground 1 but for a duty we owe the court and the additional 
light thrown on ground 2 et seq. 
The Court's opinion treats Benson v. Rozelle as if 
overruled by Gibbs v. District Court. We submit that such 
is not the effect of the Gibbs case, but this Court dis-
tinguished the Benson-Rozelle case and left both cases 
standing, each within its distinctive field. Had the two 
cases been deemed so much alike in fact or principle as to 
justify but one rule it would have been easy for this Court 
to have said so and to have overruled Benson v. Rozelle 
as a precedent in future cases. Whatever individual lawyers 
may think as to the distinction taken between the two cases 
is of no importance, in practice, since it is the prerogative 
of this Court to draw distinctions and declare the law in 
its own wisdom and discretion. It did this in the Gibbs 
case and told the bar and public that both cases are correct, 
each within its own field, and that both cases might be cited 
in future. This present appeal presents a complaint that 
is on all-fours with that in the Benson--Rozelle case, almost 
word for word in allegation and prayer for relief. Hence 
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our brief on appeal was prepared in reliance on that case. 
Is it proper then to defeat that reliance and to interpose 
the Gibbs case which this Court declared in its opinion 
therein to rest upon distinguishable grounds from the Ben-
son-Rozelle case? 
"The Supreme Court is bound by its former de-
ci·sions. Its former decisions are until overruled or 
modified binding upon the Supreme Court." 
Stookey v. Green, 178 Pac. 586 (Utah) ; 
"Thos·e who transact business in the State have 
a right to rely upon the law as declared by the 
Supreme Court." 
Passow· v. Emery•, 106 Pac. 935 (Utah). 
And, as this Court observed on another occasion, it 
is more important that the law be settled than how it is 
settled. The public is entitled to know with certainty. 
Fixity is more important than abstractions. The suspense 
of imperfect opinion is devastating. If the law on any sub-
ject is subject to change any day without notice, how are 
clients to be safely advised. It costs money, a lot of it, to 
litigate, and clients should not be invited to embark if the 
landmarks are liable to disappear before or when the case ' 
is decided. 
In so speaking,. we yield to no one in the respect 
and affection in which we hold our Supreme Court. The 
bench and bar are not antagonists but companions and fel-
low workers in the cause of applied justice. We of the bar 
can render our best service to the Court by cordial coop-
eration and ·clear and free exchange of views. 
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In Congress they have invented a Committee on Rules, 
which is a sort of flying squadron, empowered at any 
moment to get into action and improvise a rule of procedure 
that will cut the dykes of existing rules and turn the tide 
of legislation in any desired direction. That device may 
have its usefulness in formulating legislation, but nothing 
similar has heretofore been deemed appropriate in judicial 
procedure. This Court stands ready at all times to invalidate 
any statute that is ex post facto in its operation as uncon-
stitutional. Should it do less when one of its own decis~ions 
has an ex post facto operation and effect? 
Our case law is now so colossal that we do not believe 
it humanly possible for the members of this Court or any 
Court, to always have in mind the implications of all its 
former decisions, not to mention those of the other states 
and federal which are constantly being cited. It is entitled 
therefore to the vigilance of counsel to aid it in steering a 
true compass course; else the case law may drift into 
confusion. 
One consequence of the present opinion is that it 
goes far to undermine not merely the Benson-Rozelle case 
but the far more important decision of this Court in Evans 
v. Evans, 98 Utah, 189; 98 Pac. 2d, 703. The decision in 
that case was an unusually careful and well-considered 
opinion by Judge Wolfe, expounding the privacy and prop-
erty rights of the citizen in his books and records and their 
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The law of that case will fall largely into discard 
if in this case Newman's books and records are liable to be 
ordered to be produced en masse before a referee for all 
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and sundry, as is purported to be done by the orders of 
reference in this case (rec. p. 74-75, 78-79), without any 
previous showing and judicial determination of a right 
thereto. This Court, in its decision in the Benson-Rozelle 
case may well have had these constitutional considerations 
in mind and decided the case in deference thereto, while in 
the Gibbs case it did not. Evans v. Evans was decided by 
this Court after both those cases, but the constitutional im-
munity expounded thereby preexisted both those cases. 
Benson v. Rozelle required the averment of partnership 
(k~ystone to the right of inspection of alleged partnership 
books and records-) to be judicially determined, before the 
defendant could be deprived of his property rights in the 
privacy of his books and records and in the information 
they contain. The Gibbs case and the present case do not 
extend that protection or immunity, but order production 
en masse long prior to any attempted adjudication of the 
question of partnership and of the right to inspection. 
Yet, this Court pointed out in Evans v. Evans, irreparable 
harm and injury inay occur before the error could be cor-
rected by appeal after final judgment. 
In the Gibbs case this Court say that the district court ~ 
it not required by statute to determine matters in bar of 
an accounting before taking the account (which involves 
production of books and papers). Perhaps not. But the 
constitutions, state and national, which are higher than 
any statute, forbids an order for mass production of books 
and papers, such as we have here, without any previous 
showing of the plaintiff's right thereto and without the 
safeguards prescribed by this Court in Evatns v. Evans, 
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supra. And there is no disc1·etion of procedure that can 
justify letting down the bars in this respect. The rule in 
Benson v. Rozelle extends this protection against unreason-
able search and seizure until the right is first adjudicated. 
As this Court observed in Evans v. Evans, business books 
and records often contain information of the utmost con-
cern to the owner, as well as to the inquisitive eyes of 
competitors, or their agents or accomplices. Undue ex-
posure thereof may spell destruction and ruin. The rule 
in the Gibbs case appears to let down the bars because no 
stat'ute compels discretion. The rule in Benson-Rozelle 
averts harm from invasion of constitutional rights before 
it is done, by appeal with certiorari in aid. The rule in 
the Gibbs case compels resort to the writ of prohibition 
to avert the harm before it happens. And this Court may 
soon be overrun by petitions for prohibition from all over 
the state from litigants desiring to resist attempted piracy 
of their books and papers. For if, upon final decree it be 
adjudged that no partnership existed, the harm will al-
ready have been done without redress. 
The writer of this brief was not the trial attorney. 
From a close reading of this record he concludes that this 
harm has. not yet occurred in this case, but that it n1ay be 
if the case ever reaches the accounting stage, or the stage 
at which a valid order is asked for mass production of 
books and papers of the defendant in order to proceed 
with the accounting without the showing required by this 
Court in Evans v. Evans. We believe that whatever investi-
gations were made by the referee in this case were made 
upon books and records submitted by appellees alone, and 
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not upon appellant's books. See our opening brief pp. 93-97. 
Which is all the more reason why an attempted exparte 
adjudication of appellant's rights from unsworn books or 
records kept or produced by others, without opportunity 
for inspection or cross-examination, should not stand. Mere 
written hears~ay. 
GROUND 2 
This injury done to the case law is without balancing 
consideration in arriving at a decision of this case under 
the rule in the Gibbs case. The procedure authorized by 
the Gibbs· case as discretionary with the trial court cannot 
save the judgment appealed from reversal. Grant that it 
was within discretion for the trial court to combine the 
issues in bar of accounting, and the issues in accounting, 
all in one trial. What is the consequence? The record shows 
that the trial court did choose to proceed in the manner 
prescribed by the rule in the Benson-Rozelle case by trying 
the issues in bar of accounting first. Whether it pursued 
this course in deference to this court's ruling in Benson v. 
Rozelle, or as a matter of discretion, does not appear. Nor 
is it material, since this Court recognizes its right to so 
proceed in its discretion, even if not obliged to do so by 
jurisdictional considerations, and it will not review that dis-
cretion. In so doing, the trial court conducted a preliminary 
trial on the question of partnership, or no, ruled out all 
evidence in accounting, and sustained objections from both 
sides to questions by the other side seeming to call for 
matters in accounting. See our opening brief pp. 11-13 
with record page citations. 
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No error is assigned, and no one is here complaining, 
that the trial court proceeded thus. All that this appellant 
need ask, if the rule in the Gibbs case is applied in this 
one, is that the trial court, having chosen its plan of pro-
cedure, do not depart therefrom at any stage of the trial 
to appellant's injury and disadvantage. That is, it should 
not in trying first the issue of partnership and liability 
to account and rejecting all evidence of either side as to 
matters in accounting, upon reaching its decision of the 
first matter, suddenly switch over to the opposite theory 
that all matters both in bar and in accounting are determ-
inable in one trial and by one set of findings of fact, with-
out ever hearing any evidence at all upon the accounting 
issues of the case. And we mean that the trial court did 
exactly that. And this Court will see it as we go along, or 
if it reads this record closely. 
At the close of the preliminary trial on April 6, 1943 
the trial court announced its decision that the several jobs 
were joint ventures. This Court in its opinion holds, upon 
the basis of Wells v. Porter, 205 Cal. 776, 272 Pac. 1039 
that if the parties were joint adventurers they could not 
have been partners or employer-employees. If so, that 
ought to end this case in view that the plaintiffs alleged 
partnership, and the court found joint ventures, and the 
judgment should be reversed for the variance. But we are 
not dependent upon that issue alone for our right to a 
reversal in this case. Upon deciding that the jobs were 
joint ventures the trial court desired plaintiffs' counsel 
to prepare interlocutory findings and decree determining 
their right to an accounting, and inviting counsel to agree 
upon a referee to take the accounting. (rec. 303-308.) 
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Had the counsel complied and the court signed and filed 
such findings and decree, this appellant could have come 
at once to this court by appeal if the rule in Benson v. 
Rozelle was still the law. If not, he might still have re-
sorted to certiorari or prohibition as the case might be. 
But counsel did not so comply. At what point of time 
counsel began to mediate a change of tactics does not appear. 
The record merely shows that about three weeks later on 
April 24th, 1943 an order was signed and filed appointing 
Mr. Dansie as referee (rec. p. 7~76) and an amended order 
of reference on April 28, 1943 (rec. p. 78-79), without any 
findings of fact or decree to account having been signed, 
filed or entered, and without showing of their right to 
inspection of books and records. 
Our opponent will say, of course, that the case having 
been sent to a referee, the right and opportunity to offer 
any evidence desired as to matters in accounting was pre-
served. We dispute that contention and say that no such 
opportunity was ever given to offer evidence in accounting 
before either the referee or the court. Not only the referee's 
report but the record of which it is a part shows this fact 
affirmatively ·and upon the face thereof. Wherefore the 
contention of opportunity afforded to present evidence and 
to make objections before the referee is unsupported by the 
record. And wherefore also the so-called referee report is 
null and void on its face. We speak of this more fully 
under Grounds 4 to 6 hereof. 
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GROUND 3 
We object to the holding in the court's opinion that 
the trial court's own findings of fact at the end of the 
entire trial in June 1943 was complete and responsive to 
each and all of the issues so as to sustain the judgment for 
$19,451.03 against appellant. And even if so, there was 
no evidence whatever to sustain such findings. We must 
remind that the issues were dual (1) as to partnership, 
and (2) as to evidence of debits and credits in accounting 
with balance struck. In view that there was never any 
evidence in accounting taken before the Court, how can 
it be said that the findings of fact embrace a decision or 
finding of fact upon those issues? A finding of fact upon 
no evidence at all within the accounting issues surely can 
not be treated as a valid adjudication of those facts or 
issues. The very fact that a referee was appointed and 
ordered to take an account upon evidence to be presented 
before him by the parties, shows that the court never un-
dertook to hear evidence in that field on the basis of which 
it could possibly make findings of its own. The trial court 
could not make a finding of fact upon evidence which it 
never heard, and from testimony of witnesses whom it has 
never seen. If the referee conducted a trial, heard testimony 
and made findings, and had returned both findings and 
evidence into court; then the trial court would be in position 
to review the referee's findings in his report on the same 
evidence that the referee heard, and amend, add to, or set 
the same aside upon objections filed by counsel on either 
.side. Unless such evidence was reported into court in some 
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form by the referee, the trial court could neither modify 
the referee's findings nor substitute findings of its own. 
Let this distinction be borne in mind, viz : That a 
referee's report is not, in its very nature, cannot be, evi-
dence of a fact. If valid at all, it is as an adjudication of 
facts by a judicial tribunal. It is the summary and adjudi-
cated result of evidence produced prior thereto before 
the referee,-not the evidence itself. Just as the district 
court's own findings of fact constitute adjudication, not 
evidence. The referee's report or findings of fact, when 
filed in court have precisely the same function as do the 
trial court's own findings of fact when first filed in court. 
That is, they are tentative only, and subject to revision 
or amendment. Under Code 1 04-26~2. the court may on 
motion add to or modify its own findings of fact to con-
form them to the issues and evidence adduced at the trial. 
Under 104-27-6 the court may do the same thing with re-
spect to the referee's findings of fact in his report when 
returned and filed in court. But, of course, he can not 
alter, set aside or modify a referee's findings in his report 
to make same conform to the evidence taken before the 
referee, unless that evidence has been preserved and re-
turned into court by the referee with his findings of fact. 
In such case the trial court can only review the referee's 
findings to make them conform to the issues in the pleadings, 
at best. 
In this case, no evidence before the referee was cer-
tified into court by bill of exceptions or otherwise. Hence 
it was not attempted to be modified or amended in any way 
because of non-conformity with evidence taken before the 
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referee. And it could not be lawfully changed or amended 
by evidence de novo before the district court. We appre-
hend that it is an unheard of thing in court procedure for a 
party dissatisfied with a jury verdict, or a court or referee's 
findings of fact, to attempt to assail the same by evidence 
de novo of the facts, either to reduce or increase the amount 
of the money recovery. His remedy is to either (1) move 
for a new trial, or (2) to show by the record of evidence 
already taken before the court that the amount of recovery 
in the court's findings should be increased or reduced. Or 
if it is a referee's finding, that the evidence before the 
referees requires such alteration. What would this Court 
think of an attempt by a litigant to offer evidence de novo 
either in the Supreme Court, or in the District Court, to 
add to, alter or modify the amount of a money recovery 
as fixed by the verdict or findings of fact in a case? 
Ground 3 of our objections herein should be sustained. 
GROUNDS 4, 5 and 6 
The referee's report was a nullity upon its face. It 
was neither evidence nor an adjudication of facts by a 
lawful tribunal acting within the scope of statutory author-
ity. By statute a court may appoint a referee to sit as a 
court to hear evidence under oath, make findings of fact, 
and report the same with conclusions of law stated separ-
ately. Code 104-27-6. In an accounting case where the 
items of account are numerous and complex it is appro-
priate that the court appoint a competent accountant, but 
his duties remain the same, i.e., that he proceed judicially 
to conduct a public trial, and with due process of lav,r. 
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This requires notice and opportunity to be heard and to pro-
duce witnesses and cross-examine those opposed. 
Code section 104-27-6 is a legislative precaution to 
insure due process of law in trials before referees. It re-
quires a referee to set a date for trial, notify the parties 
of the time and place at least ten days ahead, and enable 
them to prepare for trial. A referee is bound to obey this 
statute just as much as is the district court itself, in setting 
its cases for trial. A failure to comply deprives a litigant 
of due process and voids the proceedings. 
Sec. 104-27-7 authoriz·es the referee to administer 
oaths to the witnesses at the trial. Sec. 104-39-8 authorizes 
a referee to sign and settle a bill of exceptions of the evi-
dence before him and as well after as before he ceases to 
be such referee. Sec. 104-54-5 provides that the rules of 
evidence before a referee are the same as those in court 
trials. In Reever v. White, 8 Utah, 188, 30 Pac. 685 our 
Supreme Court held that a referee has power to grant a 
nonsuit for insufficient evidence. 
The present statute (104-27-6) traces back to terri-
torial days. Utah Rev. Stat. 1888, sees. 3388-3390 con-
tained all the essentials of the present statute, notwith-
standing changes in phraseology. Under the earlier statute 
the practice was :-
1. The referee tried the issues; 
2. The referee reported his findings of fact and con-
clusions; 
3. The parties filed any desired exceptions thereto 
in the trial court. 
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4. The court ruled on the exceptions and rendered 
judgment on the referee's findings. 
5. The party alleging error filed his motion for new 
trial. 
6. The trial court ruled on motion for new trial. 
7. Appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Hanks v. Matthews, 8 Utah, 181; 30 Pac. 504. 
Now where a trial court has itself tried the case and 
heard the witnesses, he can remember the evidence and 
rule on a motion for a new trial on ground of no evidence 
or insufficient evidence. But where the evidence was pro-
duced before a referee, the trial court cannot do this unless 
the evidence before the referee has. been preserved and 
reported back by the referee with his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. In the absence thereof, the trial court 
must do what the Supreme Court does when a case comes 
up without a bill of exceptions,-i.e., presume that the 
evidence if preserved would support the findings. This, 
however, assumes that the referee has. proceeded lawfully, 
given due notice, conducted a trial in the presence of the 
parties as required by the due process clause and by the 
state statute. 
The failure of the referee to set a time for trial and 
give the parties. notice of the time and place, or to conduct 
any public trial appears affirmatively by recitals upon its 
face and by his testimony on the face of the record of which 
his report is a part. Our statements of fact from the record 
and record page citations in this respect are set forth in 
our opening brief (rec. pp. 77 to 98), so we need not repeat. 
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"The constitutional guaranty of due process 
applies to both civil and criminal procedure, as well 
as to statutes regulating the same. This includes the 
right to notice and hearing before a competent tri-
bunal." 
16 Corp. Jur. Seg., page 1221, sec. 611 and cita-
tations. 
"Questions of due process may be directed 
against the course and manner of judicial proceed-
ings." 
Id., p. 1221, sec. 611, note 57 and cases. 
Due process includes the right to notice, not 
only with respect to the original summons and ser-
vice thereof to bring defendant into court to ans-
wer,-
Nais'bitt v. Herricks, 2'90 Pac. 950 (Utah). 
Riggins v. Dist. Court, 51 Pac. 2d, 645, syl. 37; 
(Utah). 
-but also with respect to interlocutory orders and 
proceedings which affect his rights. 
Hilton Bros. Motor Co. v. Dist. Court, 82 Utah, 
372; 25 Pac. 2d, 595. 
Cox v. Dixie PoW'er' Co., 16 Pac. 2d, 916 (Utah). 
Cupit v. Park City Bank, 10 Utah, 294; 37 Pac. 
564. 
Cupit v. Park City Bank, 11 Utah, 427; 40 Pac. 
707. 
The Legislature may prescribe what notice shall 
be given which shall conform to "due process' re-
quirements by affording an opportunity to be heard. 
16 C. J. S. 1256, note 96, citing cases. 
12 C. J., 1230, notes 32, 33 etc., and cases. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
This our Legislature has done by section 104-27-6 and 
the referee was bound to obey and comply with it before 
proceeding to any sort of judicial investigation. 
The failure of the trial court itself to give a 
defendant notice of the time and place of trial was 
held to be a violation of the due process clause of 
the constitution, in 
Timmerman v. Martin, 176 Sou. (Ala.), 198. 
And if so, it was just as much a lack of due process 
for the court's referee in this case to neglect the same, 
step. 
Notice must be given of all essential steps in the 
proceedings. 
Timmerman v. Martin, supra, and 
Utah cases above cited. 
16 C. J. S. p. 1222-3, note 64 and cases cited. 
To illustrate. In deference to due process requirements, 
a defendant is duly summoned into court and the process 
returned and filed in court. The record is perfect and shows 
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and the court 
vested with full power and right to proceed and try the 
case. But suppose, at the moment the defendant enters the 
court room with his witnesses, they are seized by a burley 
court bailiff or deputy sheriff and gagged and bound, but 
permitted to remain in the court room and to hear every 
word that is said by his opponents and the court until the 
court has made and filed its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. Would that be due process? If so, of what 
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value is due process tothe man who is thus deprived of its 
benefits? Is he any better off than if he had never been 
served with a summons in the case? The record may look 
all right on its face, until attacked by evidence alimUde. 
If, however, the record is made to show by recitals on its 
face that the defendant was thus manhandled and abused, 
the judgment and all proceedings would be adjudged void 
upon its face. 
What difference, in substance, is there between that 
. situation and a case where either the· court or its referee, 
after defendant answers and the case is ready for trial, slips 
'{)ff down the street or in a back alley, or to any unnoticed 
time or place, and proceeds to hold a trial, gather up gossip 
.and hearsay, and. come back into court and file something 
called a referee's report, or a finding of fact by the court 
·based upon it? 
As we stated, by citation from 16 C. J. S. 1221, sec. 
'611, the constitutional guaranty of due process applies 
to both civil and criminal procedure alike. In criminal 
,cases this. requires that the defendant be personally present 
in court at every step in the prosecution. In civil cases it 
only requires that the defendant have notice and oppor-
tunity to attend and defend. With that qualification, all 
that is said in either class of cases is applicable to each 
alike. Where due process is not observed the court or 
tribunal ioses jurisdiction to proceed, and its acts are void. 
'The tribunal loses' its judicial character. 
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"When a court having jurisdiction over a pris-
oner denies him a constitutional right or immunity, 
its jurisdiction ceases and its acts are void." 
16 C. J. S. sec. 246 page 182 note 78 citing: 
Miskimmins v. Shaver, (Wyo.), 58 Pac. 411; 
49 L. R. A. 831. 
"The court may lose jurisdiction over the person 
of the defendant if it lets him go without day." 
16 Corp. Jur., page 182, note 75 citing: 
State v. Grimes, 141 Pac. 184 (Wash.). 
"And, although a court has jurisdiction of a 
case, it may be shown that under the facts existing 
at the time the court assumed to act were such that 
the case was not within the jurisdiction of the court; 
and under such circumstances it is, of course, im--
proper for the court to proceed further." 
15 Corp. Jur. page 824, Courts sec. 135 note 71 
citing: 
Pickering v. Pickering, 21 N. H. 537; 
Ottawa Bank v. Roxborough, 18 Ont. L. 511. 
"Where the court having acquired jurisdiction 
has lost it, the same rule applies." 
Emery v. State, 123 S. W. 133 (Tex.) citing: 
State v. Hall, 49 Me., 412; 
Hamm v. Wickline, 26 Ohio State, 81. 
"There is another line of cases, well known and 
unbroken, to the effect that the judgment of the 
court is void where the court has gone in excess of 
and beyond its jurisdiction." 
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Etheridge v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. App. 473 at 
page 478; 175 S. W. 702, 86 A. L. R., 1136, 
note. 
"A judgment is void on collateral attack where 
either of the following is lacking, viz: 
1. A legal organization of the court or tribunal; 
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
3. Jurisdiction over the person; 
4. Where one or more of these is lost after it 
once existed. 
In any such case, the judgment and all rights 
and titles founded thereon are void even in the hands 
of a bona fide purchaser. The dignity of the court 
is of no concern. 
Pioneer Land Co. v. Maddux, 42 Pac. 295, 297 
(col. 2). 
·The referee's report shows on its face that due process 
was not accorded. The statute and constitutions were dis-
regarded. These fight back and strike down the offending 
record and nullify it. It is a dead and lifeless thing. The 
district court has no power to adopt, add to, amend or 
modify it. The court does not even know on what evidence, 
if any, the referee based its report, save that, knowing 
the referee acted unlawfully, he had no judicial capacity to 
.act upon any evidence. For his failure to get jurisdiction 
of appellant's person by giving him notice of a time and 
place for trial, he had no jurisdiction to determine any mat-
ter of fact, or to bind him by his attempted adjudication 
thereof. All his acts were void. 
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"A judgment absolutely void * * * may be 
attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, when-
ever and wherever it presents itself, and either by 
parties or by strangers. It is simply a nullity, and 
can be neither a basis nor evidence of any right 
whatever." 
In re Pusey's Estate, 181 Pac. 648, 6.50. 
Fe:rbes v. Hyde, 31 Cal. 342, 348. 
In re Christensen, 53 Pac. 1003 (Utah). 
Jefferson v. Galla.gher, 150 Pac. 1071, syl. 5. 
"A judgment rendered without jurisdiction of 
the person is no judgment at all. It is a mere nullity. 
It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid 
adjudication, nor is it entitled to the respect ac-
corded to one. It can neither affect, impair or create 
rights. As to the person in whose favor it professes 
to be it places him in no better position than he 
occupied before, and gives him no new right. As 
to third persons it can be neither a source of title, 
nor an impediment in the way of enforcing claims. 
It is not necessary to take any steps to have it re-
versed, vacated or set aside. Whenever it is brought 
up against the party he may assail its pretensions 
and show its worthlessness. It is supported by no 
presumptions and may be impeached in any action, 
direct or collateral. It is entirely void and may be 
s.hown to be void in a collateral as well as in a direct 
proceeding." 
Jefferson v. Gallagher, 150 Pac. 1971 (Okla.). 
And our Supreme Court declared the law in almost 
identical terms, in a case where the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction both of the person and subject matter. But 
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the lack of jurisdiction of either would have produced the 
same result. Thus : 
"A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having 
no authority to determine the matter in issue is 
necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown 
to be such in any collateral or other proceeding in 
which it may be drawn in question. 
"No appeal can be necessary from such a judg--
ment. It is of no effect, and parties attempting to· 
· execute it are trespassers.. A void judgment is in 
legal effect no judgment. From it no rights can be· 
acquired. Being worthless in itself it neither binds 
nor bars any one. All acts performed under it, and 
all claims flowing out of it, are void. The parties, 
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as tres--
passers. The purchaser at a sale under its authority 
finds himself without title and without redress. 
"No intendment of law or presumption of fact 
can be made in favor of its jurisdiction, whether it be 
as to the subject 1'Yll1Atter or the person of the d;efe'Yir-
dant." 
In re Ckristtens·en (Utah), 53 Pac. 1003, 1006~ 
Concerning such a void judgment it has been held that:-
A judgment of affirmance thereof by the Su-
preme Court on appeal would not impart validity to 
it, but the judgment of affirmance would itself be 
void by reason of the voidness of the judgment ap-
pealed from. 
Pioneer Land Co. v. Madd'ux, 42 Pac. 295, 295 ;: 
Chambers v. Hodges, 23 Tex., 105. 
It is not necessary to take any steps to have it 
reversed or set aside; but whenever it is brought up 
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against a party he may assail its pretensions and 
show its worthlessness. 
Jefferson v. Galla.gher, 150 Pac. 1071, syl. 5. 
Likewise as to other public records of whatever na-
ture. Thus as to tax sales and tax deeds, the Supreme Court 
of Utah has only recently held that,-
"A statement in a tax deed of a fact showing 
that it was improperly issued, is fatal to its validity." 
Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah, . . . 106 Pac. 2d, 
163 at page 175, quoting with approval from 
Price v. Barnhill, 98 Pac. 77 4 (Kan.) ; 
Wall v. Kaign, 45 Utah, 244, 144 Pac. 1100. 
Ball v. Busch, (Mich.) 31 N. W. 565, 570. 
Likewise where the tax record produced in evidence 
showed that the assessment roll did not have the County 
Auditor's authenticating affidavit thereto attached, the 
tax deed and record were held void on their face. 
Equitable Life & Casualty Co. v. Schoewe, 144 
Pac. 2d, 526, (104 Utah). 
GROUND 7 
We object to the statement in the opinion about con-
flicting evidence. In view of what has been said herein it 
is manifest that there was no conflict of evidence, insofar 
as the accounting procedure is concerned, to warrant the 
Court in invoking the rule of decision in Stanley v. Stanley, 
97 Utah, 520, 94 Pac. 2d, 46·5. Recourse to that rule must 
have been due to some misapprehension. 
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We have shown before herein that the District Court 
never took any evidence on the accounting feature of the 
case, but referred the case to a referee to take evidence 
and report. The referee made some inquiries or investiga-
tions of an unofficial nature from sundry persons not under 
oath, and out of the presence of the parties or their counsel, 
except that at times the plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Callister, 
was in some intimacy and abetting the referee in his non-
judicial inquiries. Some two months later the referee's 
so-called report was. produced from Mr. Callister's posses-
sion during a court session of some sort, where evidence was 
being produced, and filed it in the case (rec. p. 316). It 
purports to be or to contain findings of fact by the referee. 
It contains a number of schedules and tables. 
The report is not accompanied by any certified state-
ment or bill of exceptions by the referee setting out the 
evidence on which it professes to be based. It shows on its 
face that no such evidence, in a judicial sense, was ever 
produced, heard or considered. It shows that no trial was. 
ever had, or notice given to parties of the time or place 
of trial. But had the referee acted with entire regularity 
in this respect, he never reported any evidence back to the 
court. Hence it could not possibly be determined, either 
by the district court or this Court, that there had been a 
conflict of evidence before the referee warranting an appli-
cation of the rule in Stanl£y v. Stanley, 97 Utah, 520 as to 
a decision by the Supreme Court upon conflicting evidence. 
This Court has no means of knowing, judicially or other-
wise, what the evidence was before the referee, hence 
whether conflicting or not. It does not know that there was 
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any evidence at all. Judicially, and in a legal sense, it is. 
bound to know that there was no evidence at all before the 
referee, because he was without jurisdiction to sit and hear 
evidence without notice to the parties of the time and 
place of trial. The referee's report is void upon its face, 
hence there can be no presumptions in its favor, as we 
have seen by citations herein. 
All right, then, where could the conflict of evidence 
have occurred on this accounting feature, to which the 
opinion refers? As we have stated, and we deem the propo-
sition incontestable, there is no authority of law for the 
district court to have taken evidence on its own account in 
court, on the basis of which to overthrow the findings of 
fact by the referee. If convinced that the referee had 
proceeded illegally, so that his findings had no value, it 
might perhaps have quashed the report and set it aside, 
and proceeded to take evidence de novo covering the whole 
field of the accounting, as if the case had not been referred 
to a referee. This it did not do. If the referee's report was 
null and void on its face, it could not be added to or amended, 
not even if it was accompanied by a transcript of evidence 
taken ex parte. If it could be adjudged valid, then there is no 
authority of law for the district court to take evidence de 
novo upon which to add to, vary or modify the findings of 
fact by the referee based upon the evidence taken before 
him. The remedy would be to move for a new trial if 
dissatisfied with the amount found by the referee, which 
was $13,386.37. 
Neither a jury verdict nor a court finding, or a referee· 
finding can be increased in the trial court by new evidence-
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·before the court. If so, this writer has never heard of it 
,during nearly fifty years of practice. And if not, where 
·could the conflict of evidence occur, warranting the rule of 
·decision in equity cases in Stanley v. Stanley? 
On the other hand, should it be contended that the 
referee's report being void. on its face, the d~strict court 
had the right upon its being filed in court, and its voidness 
noted, to have proceeded to hear evidence in accounting as 
-if the case had not been referred to the referee. Or, which 
is the same thing in effect, treat the referee's report as 
·merely advisory and make its own findings of fact. Then 
what? The answer is that the district court did not do any 
such thing. Nor did either party attempt to try the case 
•over again, ignoring the referee's work. The district court's 
findings ( rec. p. 83-90) do not on their face purport to 
rest upon a trial or evidence de novo. It professes on its 
face to rest upon the adjudication of facts by the referee 
in his report, if such it can be termed. Several pages of the 
tabulated figures in that report are copied bodily into the 
court's findings of fact. And the latter recites in paragraphs 
2, 3 et seq. that the court "adovts the referee's report in part 
,OJnd modifies the same in part." ( rec. p. 84.) 
The report being void for want of due process of law 
in its preparation, could not be lawfully adopted in who~e 
"()r in part. And even were it not void on its face, the dis-
trict court could not adopt it in part and modify it in part, 
in the absence of a transcript of the evidence before the 
referee on which to test the correctness of the referee's 
findings. And the Court did not take any evidence in 
.Court to take the place of what the referee may have 
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heard but did not certify into court. As we have stated, 
the District Court is without power to take evidence de novo• 
in court as a basis on which to judge whether the. referee's 
findings were supported by the evidence which the referee· 
heard and considered, but did not report back to the court. 
If so, will some one please point out the section of our 
code or statutes where such statutory authority may be 
found. The district court cannot even do that in order to 
support its own findings of fact,-not to mention the refer-
ee's findings. When facts are once "found" or adjudicated, 
that ends the trial and all taking of evidence, until in some 
lawful way the findings are vacated and set aside and 
a new trial ordered. See Utah decisions under Utah Rev~ 
Stat. 1933, sees. 104-26-2 and 104-26-3, same sections of 
U. A. C. 1943. 
This does not mean that we assert the plaintiffs did 
not attempt to put in some evidence before and after the, 
referee's so-called report was produced and filed in the 
district court by Mr. Callister. But we do say that the dis-
trict court had no authority to receive it for the purpose 
of judging or modifying the referee's report. And we 
further say that such evidence was not in its nature, char-
acter or extent such as could take the place of that on which 
the referee attempted to act and make a finding. It did 
not attempt to furnish evidence of debits and credits, and 
balance, based upon transactions down to Sept. 3, 1942, 
upon which the district court could have made findings 
of fact, in lieu of those contained in the referee's report,. 
yielding a balance of $13,386.37 or any other amount. 
What the plaintiffs attorney did attempt to do was. 
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to produce evidence of transactions after Sept. 3, 1942 
that would enable him to enlarge the balance due from 
$13,386.37 found in the referee's report, to $19,451.03 
as contained in the final judgment. Not only was this 
attempt ultra vires of the district court's powers, as 
we have shown, but there was no competent evidence of 
facts entitling plaintiffs to recover against appellant the 
additional or any other amount, even had the Court au-
thority to consider it. If the Court, or any one, doubts this, 
or desires to satisfy himself, we respectfully refer to the 
proceedings of the second session of court beginning on 
record page 309 and to the end. It is too long to quote 
,or condense. Anyone can read and masticate it. 
GROUND 8 
In this ground we object to the implication or holding 
of the court's opinion that appellant by failure to., object 
to the referee's report when produced in court and filed by 
Mr. Callister, thereby waived his right to question its effect 
whether as evidence or as~ a judicial adjudication of the 
facts. As a judicial record adjudication of facts, being 
void upon its face, it can be objected to at any time or place 
on direct or collateral attack. (ante pp. 20-25.) If treated 
merely as a piece of evidence (?),it has none of the criteria 
of evidence according to any tests in the law books. It is 
merely written hearsay reporting what some unknown 
and unsworn persons are reputed to have told the author 
,of the report out of the presence of the parties or their 
counsel. As such, it has no value whether in or out of the 
record. 
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We further assert that, if treated as evidence, it is 
incorrect to assume that any such item or document be-
comes valid evidence to prove anything claimed for it, by 
its proponent, simply because it is not objected to by the 
party against whom it is offered. Error does not usually 
lie to the mere admission of offered evidence that is claimed 
to be incompetent, except in jury trials. In equity trials 
the chancellor is presumed to know the rules of evidence 
and give to a document only such value and weight as it 
on its face is entitled to. 
Let us illustrate: Suppose in an action by A against 
an insurance company B to recover an annuity payable 
to A during the life of C. At the trial A undertakes to 
prove that C is still alive by producing C in court. C is 
brought in, but it is his dead body with rigor mortis, 
death palor, and odor from partial decomposition. B does 
not object to the corpse being admitted in evidence. Is B 
therefore precluded from contending that C is dead be-
cause his cadaver was offered and admitted in evidence 
without objection? 
At a murder trial, the defendant pleads not guilty and 
denies the corpus delicti, claiming that the supposed victim 
is yet alive. He produces the victim's corpse with a bullet 
hole in his head, and it is admitted without objection from 
the State. Is the State precluded thereby from contending 
that the man is dead? 
We need not rely upon possible but suppositious cases. 
We take one now from a case but recently decided by this 
Court. In Buhler v. Maddison, 140 Pac. 2d, 933 (to appear 
in 104 Utah) the plaintiff sued his employer for personal 
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InJuries sustained in his employment, on the ground that 
the employer had failed to provide workmen's compensation 
insurance. The services and injury occurred in Nevada. 
The plaintiff therefore offered in evidence part of the N e-
vada compensation statute similar to the Utah statute, im-
posing liability for injuries where the employer fails to 
provide compensation insurance. The Nevada statute was 
admitted in evidence without objection from defendant 
employer. But this did not prevent our Utah Supreme Court 
from weighing and cons,idering the evidence and rendering 
judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the of-· 
fered statute did not make out a case for the plaintiff. Yet 
if the rule applied in the opinion at bar had been applied 
in that case, the defendant would have been precluded from 
objecting to the effect of the Nevada statute by his failure: 
to object to its admission in evidence, and this Court must 
have given it all the effect claimed for it. 
&ores of cases like this, in principle, might be cited~ 
Thus in cases involving tax titles,, or suits upon void judg-
ments, and the like, it may be to the interest of a party 
not to object to the admission in evidence of the tax record, 
or the judgment record, knowing full well that it is void 
and will so appear upon its face. But that does not estop 
him to deny that the record is void, not any more than 
would the admission of a corpse in evidence without ob-
jection prevent him from saying that the man is dead. 
In Equitable Life & Cas. Co. v. Schoewe, 144 Pac. 2d, 
526, 105 Utah ... , the tax record produced in evidence: 
showed that the tax sale was void because the assessment 
roll produced in evidence without objection did not have 
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the County Auditor's affidavit attached thereto as required 
by law. 
The fact is that a plaintiff may sue to cancel a void 
tax sale, or a void judgment, for defects appearing upon 
its face. It is then to his interest to produce in evidence 
the void record to prove his averment that the sale or 
judgment is void. It is therefore admitted in evidence "with-
out objection" from him. Is he therefore precluded from 
contending that the record is void? Yet the case is no 
different from what it would be if the same void record 
was offered in evidence by his opponent and admitted with-
out his objection, knowing full well that it would prove 
its own voidness and invalidity. 
"A statement in a tax deed showing that it was 
improperly issued is fatal to its validity." 
Price v. Barnhill, 79 Kano 93, 95, 98 Pac. 774 
(quoted with approval in Telonis v. Staley1 
106 Pac. 2d, 163, at page 175 (104 Utah 0 0) 
Wall v. Kaign, 45 Utah, 244; 144 Pac. 1100. 
"The legislature did not intend to say that a 
paper shall be held prima facie valid when it carries 
upon its face the evidence that shows it was void." 
Ball v. Busch, 64 Mich. 336, 31 N. W. 565, 570 
(quoted with approval in Telonis v. Staley, 
supra, and in Wall v. Kaign, supra). 
"Thus, where a tax deed shows by recitals on 
its face that the property was sold to the County 
at a competative sale, the sale and deed were void. 
The law does not authorize such a thing to be done." 
Wall v. Kaign, supra. 
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And finally, the motion. for a new trial gave the trial 
court full opportunity to weigh the evidence in all its 
aspects and to consider whether its judgment could be 
supported upon the entire record. ( rec. p. 96.) 
GROUND 9 
This ground comprehends all the foregoing 1 to 8. 
GROUNUS 10 and 11 
This ground involves a disregard of our statute U.A.C. 
1943, Title 69, Chapter 1, which however is discussed in 
our separate petition and brief for modification filed here-
with, to which reference is made to avoid repetition. 
GROUND 12 
The Court by its opinion affirmed a judgment for 
$19,451.03 without any evidence to support it, and without 
any finding of fact by either the court or referee that can 
sustain it, or sustain any finding if made. The so-called 
finding by the Court depends not upon evidence before the 
Court warranting such a judgment as that, but upon a 
finding by the referee that is void upon its face. It contains 
no presumptions in its favor. It may be resisted at all 
times and places whether on direct or collateral attack. 
See cases ante p. 20-2'5. 
The void referee report, it is claimed, recommends a 
judgment against appellant for $13,386.37. The appellees 
claiming to be dissatisfied with the amount, sought to in-
crease it by evidence before the court, after the referee's 
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void report was returned and filed. The report being void, 
could not be added to, modified or amended. If it could 
be treated as valid, then appellees should have sought a 
remedy by motion to vacate it and grant a new trial, or by 
a motion to review it upon the evidence taken before the 
referee, if that evidence was preserved by certified tran-
script or bill of exceptions. There was no authority of law 
for the district court to hear evidence to enlarge and supple-
ment the amount found by the referee in his report, no 
matter whether the report be valid or void. Not any more 
than could the district court hear evidence to enlarge the 
recovery in a jury verdict returned into court. There is 
neither evidence nor finding of fact to sustain either the 
referee's $13,386.37 nor the court's enlargement thereof up 
to $19,451.03. The district court exceeded its jurisdiction 
in permitting the attempt to so enlarge the recovery, and 
.also in including the referee's $13,386.37 in its judgment. 
The judgment appealed from should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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